A simple Tullock contest model is used to predict levels of effort in English professional football (soccer). The effort of the teams is reflected in the numbers of fouls committed and the numbers of yellow and red cards awarded. Effort levels are found to be higher in matches between evenly talented teams, confirming the idea that asymmetries result in lower effort by participants. The results also suggest that teams' effort levels are strategic complements.
Introduction
Tullock's (1980) contest model is a standard tool in economics and is well known in the literature on tournaments, contests, and rent-seeking games. Corchon (2007) reviews this literature. In a winner-take-all contest, the model defines the ex ante probability of winning as a ratio of each contestant's investment relative to the sum of investments supplied by all contestants. In general, however, the Tullock model does not predict whether effort is a strategic substitute or complement in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) ; this depends upon the payoff structure.
Empirical applications of the Tullock model are rare, due in part to the non-observability of effort. For example, data on bribes and the transfer of intangible assets in rent-seeking contests may be unobtainable. This paper contributes to the non-experimental empirical Tullock contest literature (Note 1). The behavior of teams in English professional football (soccer) is modeled as a Tullock contest. One important influence on the outcome of football matches (apart from underlying team quality) is the contributed effort of the teams. Working hard to press the opposition and make tackles will eventually result in foul play and yellow and red cards being awarded. Therefore, effort is measured by the numbers of fouls committed by the home and away teams, and the numbers of yellow and red cards awarded against each team (Note 2).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical model. Section 4 reports the empirical results; and Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
This section develops a simple contest model for football match outcomes. Before the match, each manager (coach) decides independently on the conduct of his team: specifically, whether the team will work hard to tackle players of the opposition. Effort is measured by a continuous variable i e >0, where i=1, 2 denotes the home and away teams. Greater effort carries a cost, because it increases the probability that a player receives a caution (yellow card) or is dismissed from the field of play for the remainder of the game (red card). A red card leads to a suspension, preventing the player from appearing in either one, two or three of his team's next scheduled games. A player who accumulates five (ten) yellow cards in different games within the season before 31 December (10 April) receives a one (two) match suspension. The marginal cost of effort, denoted c i , may differ between teams. The marginal cost of effort is higher the larger is the number of injured and suspended players in team i's playing squad, and the smaller is the overall size of the squad (Note 3).
into the teams' expected payoff functions: p(e 1 , e 2 )=prob(home win) +0.5prob(draw). p(e 1 , e 2 ) is the home team's success probability, and 1 -p(e 1 , e 2 ) is the away team's success probability (Note 4).
The teams are assumed to be heterogeneous in underlying quality, and an asymmetric contest model is required (Corchon, 2000) . The absolute quality if team i, which is common knowledge before the match, is denoted  i .
Home-field advantage, arising from the support the home team receives from the crowd and from any possible refereeing bias (Dawson, Dobson, Goddard & Wilson, 2007) , is represented by a parameter h. The home team's prior success probability, defined for e 1 =e 2 =0, is
Positive effort levels by either team influence the actual success probabilities, such that ) might be decreasing in e 1 , because extreme effort raises team i's probability of having players dismissed to a level that reduces team i's probability of success in the current match. It is obvious, however, that teams seeking to maximize their own success probabilities would not select such extreme values of e 1 or e 2 . Accordingly, the possible negative relationship between the levels of effort and the success probability at extreme values of e 1 or e 2 is not represented by (2).
The expected payoffs for teams 1 and 2 are
where U i represents the gross payoff (before deducting the cost arising from greater effort) to team i from winning the match (Note 5). U i depends on the importance of the match to team i. For example, U i is large if team i is near the top of its divisional league table and in contention for the championship, qualification for European competition, or promotion to a higher division. U i is also large if team i is near the bottom of its divisional table and in danger of relegation to the division below. U i is small when team i is out of contention for any of these end-of-season outcomes.
The absolute team quality measures  1 and  2 are determined by the quality of playing talents, the ability of the managers, and the teams' tactical capabilities. All of these determinants may vary over time, even within a football season. Prior to each match, the team managers select e 1 and e 2 so as to maximize their teams' expected payoffs. The non-cooperative solution for the equilibrium levels of effort is
From contest theory it is well known that the response of the strategic variable (the level of effort) to a small change in the payoffs and the individual costs depends upon the levels of the payoffs and costs. The partial derivatives of (4) 
Equivalent results can be derived for small changes in the away team's win payoff. In (5),
is unambiguously positive (negative). This leads to
Result 1: An increase in the payoff from a win for either team will unambiguously increase that team's level of effort. An increase in the own cost of effort will unambiguously decrease that team's level of effort.
The effect on effort of an increase in the opposing team's payoff from a win is ambiguous, and the effect of an increase in the opposing team's marginal cost of effort is also ambiguous. We focus on an increase in U 1 , which leads to the same qualitative results as a decrease in c 1 . In (5), rU 1 and (1-r)U 2 are the two teams' expected prior payoffs. The away team will increase (decrease) its level of effort if its relative expected prior payoff -compared to the home team -is larger (smaller) than its relative marginal cost of effort. In this case, there is more (less) at stake for the away team, taking into account the relative costs of effort. As a result, the away team responds with a higher (lower) level of effort to an increase in the home team's gross payoff.
By substituting (4) into (2), the equilibrium solution for the home team's success probability is
Comparing (6) with (1), the home team's equilibrium success probability is larger (smaller) than its prior success probability (i) if the home team's win payoff is larger (smaller) than the away team's win payoff, and effort costs are identical, and (ii) if the home team's marginal costs of effort are smaller (larger) than the away team's marginal costs of effort and payoffs are identical. Equation (6) shows that c i and U i play similar roles in the model. Finally, the values of r at which the teams' levels of effort are maximized are derived from (4) 
Data and Empirical Model
The data for the empirical analysis comprises all 12 216 games played in the English Premier League (the Premiership) and the three divisions of the English Football League (currently known as the Championship, League One and League Two) during the six football seasons from 2001/02 to 2006/07 (inclusive). The data source is www.football-data.co.uk. The dependent variables in the empirical models are the numbers of fouls committed by each team per game, and the numbers of yellow and red cards awarded against each team per game. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the fouls, yellow and red cards data. The sample means for the numbers of fouls awarded against the home and away teams are 12.4 and 13.1 per game, respectively. Although the number of fouls per game takes the form of count data, the number of cells appears sufficiently large to justify treating these data as continuous. Accordingly, the fouls equations are estimated as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). The interdependence between the fouls committed by the home and away teams is captured by the contemporaneous correlation between the disturbances of the home and away team equations. The sample means for the numbers of cards awarded against the home and away teams per game are 1.2687 and 1.6957 (yellow) and 0.0747 and 0.1198 (red), respectively. In this case the numbers of cells are small, necessitating the use of count data regression models. As Table 1 shows, the sample variances are similar to the sample means, which suggests that the Poisson distribution is a suitable probability model. The yellow and red cards equations are estimated using a bivariate distribution obtained from the convolution of two univariate zero-inflated Poisson probability functions via the Frank copula (Lee, 1999 ) (Note 6). The copula function contains a parameter that controls for interdependence between the cards awarded against the home and away teams. The bivariate cards regressions reported in Section 4 express the log-mean number of cards for each team as a linear function of covariates that are defined below.
According to the theoretical analysis developed in Section 2, the teams' strategic choices for their levels of effort depend upon two factors: (i) differences between the payoffs from a win for each team; and (ii) the degree of balance or imbalance between the teams' prior success probabilities. Controls are included for (i) and (ii), and for one further non-strategic determinant of the levels of foul play: (iii) weaker teams that tend to spend more of the game defending are expected to commit more fouls and collect more cards than stronger teams that spend more time attacking.
In controlling for (i) above, it is assumed that the two teams' payoffs from a win may differ once a stage of the season has been reached at which some teams have dropped out of contention for championship, European qualification, promotion or relegation outcomes. The 0-1 dummy variable HSIG = 1 if the game is significant for end-of-season outcomes for the home team, and ASIG = 1 if the game is significant for the away team. The algorithm that determines whether the game is significant assesses whether it is arithmetically possible (before the game is played) for the team to win the championship, qualify for European competition, be promoted or be relegated, if all other teams currently in contention for the same outcome take one league point on average from each of their remaining games (Note 7).
In order to control for (ii) and (iii) above, relative team quality is measured using HPROB=prob(home win)+0.5prob(draw). HPROB corresponds to the variable r, the home team's prior success probability, in the theoretical model. A numerical value for HPROB for each of the N=12 216 sample games is generated from the results forecasting model described in full by Goddard (2005) (Note 8). Included among the covariates of this model are HSIG and ASIG (as defined above), which control for the effect of incentives on the result probabilities. In the present case, HPROB should reflect prior success probabilities, which depend upon the underlying quality of the two teams, but should not incorporate any incentives effects. Therefore in generating HPROB from the forecasting model, we reset the values of HSIG and ASIG to zero for the (out-of-sample) games for which the forecasts are produced.
A convenient measure of the competitiveness of the game, or uncertainty of game outcome, is UNCERT = HPROB(1-HPROB). UNCERT is maximized when HPROB=0.5. A positive relationship is expected between UNCERT and the numbers of fouls and cards awarded. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the HPROB, UNCERT, HSIG and ASIG covariates. 0.9510 ----Finally, the estimations include controls for several other factors that might be expected to influence the number of fouls committed and cards awarded. Individual football season dummy variables control for changes over time in the content and interpretation of the rules relating to foul play; referee fixed effects control for variation among referees in the propensity to award fouls and cards; and individual team fixed effects control for other unobservable differences between teams (Note 9).
Empirical Results
The estimation results are reported in Table 3 . Column (1) reports the SUR estimations for the numbers of fouls committed by the home and away teams, and columns (2) and (3) report maximum likelihood estimation results for the bivariate regressions for the numbers of cards awarded against the home and away teams. Coefficients are not reported. *,**,*** denote coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, one-tail tests. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The coefficients on HSIG in the equations for home-team fouls and cards are insignificant, while the coefficients on ASIG are positively signed and significant at the 10% level or lower, using one-tail tests. The coefficients on HSIG and ASIG in the equations for away-team fouls and cards are positively signed and significant at the 5% level or lower.
These results provide some support for Result 1 (see Section 2), and suggest that football teams' strategies are influenced by the magnitudes of their own payoffs. However, the tendency to exert more effort if end-of-season championship, European qualification, promotion or relegation outcomes are at stake, and exert less effort if nothing is at stake, appears more pronounced for away teams than for home teams. A possible interpretation is that away teams tend to 'ease off' in unimportant end-of-season games; while home teams, perhaps more highly conscious of the critical scrutiny of their own supporters, feel obliged to demonstrate maximum commitment at all times. According to the theoretical model developed in Section 2, the relationship between the opposing team's payoff and each team's own strategy is ambiguous. Empirically, however, the results reported in Table 3 suggest that teams tend to exert more effort if the opposing team has end-of-season championship, European qualification, promotion or relegation outcomes at stake, and exert less effort if nothing is at stake.
The coefficients on UNCERT are positively signed (as expected) in every case. Two of the three coefficients on UNCERT for the home team (in the fouls and the red cards equations) are significant at the 5% level or below, and all three coefficients on UNCERT for the away team are significant at the 5% level or lower. These findings are consistent with Result 2 (see Section 2). Football teams tend to exert more effort in games involving teams that are evenly balanced, and exert less effort if there is a large disparity between the quality of the two teams.
Finally, the coefficients on HPROB are negatively signed in the equations for the home team, and positively signed in the equations for the away team. Two of the three coefficients on HPROB for the home team are significant at the 5% level or lower, and all three coefficients on HPROB for the away team are significant at the 10% level or lower. These results indicate that weaker teams (as measured by the prior success probability) tend to commit more fouls and collect more cards than stronger teams.
Conclusion
Tullock's contest success function has been widely used in the contest theory literature. Although the Tullock model provides a number of testable predictions about the behavior of agents in winner-take-all contests, empirical applications have been few and far between due to constraints on the availability of suitable data. This paper makes progress on testing the implications of the Tullock contest model using data from English professional football. In the empirical model the effort of the teams is reflected in the numbers of fouls committed and the numbers of yellow and red cards awarded. Effort tends to be higher in matches between evenly balanced teams, thus confirming a well known result that asymmetries will reduce contributions by participants (teams). It is also found that teams' behavior (especially those playing away) alters in matches that matter: levels of effort are higher when end-of-season championship, European qualification, promotion or relegation outcomes are at stake. The empirical results also suggest that the teams' levels of effort are strategic complements.
zero-inflated adjustment allows the probabilities for the cell (z 1 =0,z 2 =0) to be larger than is suggested by the Poisson distribution: an empirical regularity that is evident in the current data. 7 Alternative algorithms, based on different assumptions concerning the average performance of competing teams over their remaining games, alter the classification of a small proportion of games at the margins, but the implications for the estimation results are negligible. 8 This model generates probabilities for home win, draw and away win outcomes, based solely on historical data that are available prior to the game in question. Full details are reported in Goddard (2005) , and are not repeated here. 
